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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article deals with the contractual protection of databases that are 
made publicly available by their producers, addressing the issue in both the 
European Union and the United States.   It is useful to analyze database 
protection
1 
in this manner, especially for the United States, where the primary 
form of legal protection is contractual.  The Article first concentrates on the 
issue  in  the  European  Union
2   
and  then  extrapolates  the  reasoning  to  the 
situation in the United States. 
This Article attempts to answer two questions in the E.U. context.  First, 
can and should a database producer use contract to obtain additional protection 
for its database that is protected by the sui generis right?
3   
In other words, the 
question is whether a database producer can, and, if so, should be allowed to, 
override the limits of the sui generis right by contract.   Second, this Article 
considers whether a database not protected by the sui generis right—either 
because it was protected but now has fallen into the public domain or because 
it does not meet the requirements for protection by the sui generis right—can 
and, if so, should, be protected by contract.
4    
Similar questions arise in the 
 
 
 
 
*     Associate, Covington & Burling (Brussels).  Licenciée en droit, Université de Liège, 1997; LL.M., 
George Washington University, 1998; Diplôme d’études spécialisées en droit européen, Université de Liège, 
2001; Ph.D., University of London, 2005.  An earlier version of this Article was accepted and presented at the 
Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI) Annual Congress held in Montreal, Canada, on 
July 7–8, 2005.  The author welcomes comments and can be reached at ederclaye@hotmail.com.  She wishes 
to thank Professor Peter B. Maggs and anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts of the Article. 
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1.    Unless otherwise stated, “database protection” or “protection of databases” will be used to refer 
exclusively to the protection of the investment required to gather, verify, or present the contents of a database, 
rather than the protection of its structure. 
2.    The terms “Europe,” “European Community,” “Community,” and “European Union” will be used 
interchangeably. 
3.    In Europe, a sui generis intellectual property right protects databases.   See infra Part II; see also 
infra Part IV.A. 
4.    See infra Part IV.B. 
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United States.
5     
Although no specific intellectual property right protects 
databases in the United States, the economic rationale behind protecting 
databases contractually is the same. 
The central issue underlying these two questions is whether such use of 
contracts overprotects databases.  Overprotection, or protection over and above 
what is economically efficient, reduces social welfare.   Accordingly, to 
determine  the  extent  of  any  such  overprotection,  an  economic  analysis 
follows.
6    
Where necessary, the human rights to information and privacy are 
also taken into consideration.
7    
Before analyzing database protection from an 
economic  point  of  view,  however,  a  brief  overview  of  the  protection  of 
database contents in Europe and the United States is given.
8
 
There have been no studies on the central issue that this Article addresses: 
whether overriding the limits of the sui generis right overprotects a database 
producer’s investment in making a database.  An essentially legal study of this 
problem has recently been made in the field of copyright, however, albeit 
restricted to copyright’s exceptions and limitations.
9    
Whenever that study is 
relevant to the analysis here, it will be used.  In addition, this Article deals only 
with databases that producers decide to make available to the public without 
relying on trade secret protection, also known as the law of confidence or 
confidential information.  Thus, the protection of databases by trade secret also 
lies outside the scope of this Article. 
 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN DATABASE SUI GENERIS RIGHT AND THE 
PROTECTION OF DATABASES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Before discussing the contractual protection of databases in Europe and 
the United States, a brief discussion of the legal protection of investment in 
database creation in both legal systems is in order.  In Europe, investment in 
database  creation  is  protected  by a  specific  intellectual  property right:  the 
database sui generis right.
10    
A 1996 E.U. Directive (the Database Directive), 
which required implementation by member states by January 1, 1998, created 
this right.
11   
The sui generis right is very close to the U.K. “sweat of the brow” 
 
 
 
5.    See infra Part V. 
6.    See infra Part III. 
7.    A complete analysis of why these two human rights should be taken into consideration is outside the 
scope of this Article.   Instead, the focus is on whether contractual protection of databases is economically 
efficient.  However, the author wishes to briefly mention the human rights approach to database protection, as 
it is as important as the economic approach.  The author explores this issue in greater depth in a forthcoming 
publication. 
8.    See infra Part II. 
9.    LUCIE  M.C.R.  GUIBAULT,  COPYRIGHT  LIMITATIONS  AND  CONTRACTS:  AN  ANALYSIS  OF  THE 
CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT 1–6 (2002). 
10.    A comprehensive review of the general normative question of the adequacy of the sui generis right 
as a right to protect databases is outside the scope of this Article.   The author explores this issue in a 
forthcoming publication.  As such, this study will concentrate mainly on positive law. 
11.    Council Directive 96/9, art. 7, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (EC) [hereinafter Database Directive].  On the sui 
generis right, see, for example, MARK J. DAVISON, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES 81–82 (2003); 
Mark Schneider, The European Union Database Directive, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 558–60 (1998).
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copyright, which existed in the United Kingdom for databases before the 
implementation of the Database Directive.
12   
The Database Directive replaced 
the U.K. “sweat of the brow” copyright with “creativity copyright.”
13
 
Upon implementation of the Database Directive in E.U. member states, 
this  copyright  protects  only  a  database’s  original  structure  and  not  its 
contents.
14    
Conversely, the sui generis right protects investments in database 
creation, and thereby the database contents, rather than the structure of the 
database.
15   
As long as the database producer proves that it made a substantial 
investment in obtaining (collecting), verifying, or presenting the data contained 
in the database, it will receive sui generis protection for fifteen years.
16    
This 
protection enables a database producer to prevent others from extracting and 
reutilizing  (i.e.,  making  available  to  the  public)  a  substantial  part  of  the 
contents of the database.
17   
Implicitly, this means that extracting or reutilizing 
insubstantial parts of the database does not infringe.
18   
However, the taking of 
insubstantial parts that collectively amount to a substantial part of the contents 
of the database infringes the database-producer’s sui generis right.
19
 
Some limitations to the scope of the right apply.  For example, it is not an 
infringement  to  extract  a  substantial  part  of  a  non-electronic  database  for 
private purposes, to extract a substantial part for the purposes of illustration for 
teaching or scientific research, or to extract or reutilize a substantial part for 
the purposes of public security or an administrative or judicial procedure.
20
 
These exceptions, however, are optional, as E.U. member states are not obliged 
to  implement  them in  their  national  laws.
21      
Additionally,  like  with  other 
intellectual property rights, once the database producer puts copies of the 
database on the market, the sui generis right is exhausted approximately fifteen 
years after the database was made public.
22     
The database producer cannot 
further control the subsequent sales of copies of the database that it put on the 
market after the sui generis right is exhausted.  Also, the sui generis right is an 
anti-copying right, like a copyright; therefore, anyone can collect the same data 
and make the exact same database independently (i.e., without copying from 
the previous identical database).  In sum, limits to the sui generis right include 
non-protection  of  insubstantial  parts,  certain  exceptions  to  the  right,  the 
exhaustion principle, and the term. 
In the United States, the problem of database protection did not arise until 
fairly recently, as most courts protected the “sweat of the brow” expended in 
creating  them.    In  a  landmark  1991  decision  concerning  a  white  pages 
 
 
12.    DAVISON, supra note 11, at 143–44. 
13.    Id. at 145. 
14.    Database Directive, supra note 11, art. 3. 
15.    Id. art. 7. 
16.    Id. arts. 7, 10. 
17.    Id. art. 7. 
18.    See id. art. 8. 
19.    Id. art. 7(5). 
20.    Id. art. 9. 
21.    Id. 
22.    Id. art. 10(2).
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directory, the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service  Co. reversed  this  line of  precedent and  ruled  that  the  criterion  of 
originality was a “modicum of creativity” and not mere labor.
23   
Feist thus left 
investment in making databases without effective protection.   The 1996 
enactment of the Database Directive in Europe triggered a reaction in the 
United States.  Bills more or less comparable to the Community’s sui generis 
right scheme were drafted and presented in Congress to allow American 
database producers to receive protection in Europe.
24   
Such legislative attempts 
lasted approximately eight years, but no bill ever passed.   As a result, U.S. 
database  producers  rely  mainly on  contract  to protect  the  content of  their 
databases.
25
 
 
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT IN DATABASE CREATION 
 
Databases are information goods.  Traditionally, they have been classified 
as literary works and protected in many countries by copyright.  Depending on 
the country, only the structure or the contents are protected by copyright. 
Therefore,   an   economic   analysis   of   copyright   can   apply,   with   some 
adjustments,  to  databases.   Part  III.A  will explain the  basic economics  of 
information goods.
26   
Then, Part III.B extends such analysis to copyright law in 
particular.  Finally, Part III.C extrapolates and adapts the economic analysis of 
copyright law to investment in database creation. 
 
A.  Economics of Information Goods 
 
Information goods are public goods.   This means they are both non- 
rivalrous and non-excludable.
27    
Non-excludability is the inability to prevent 
the consumption of the good by others, regardless of desire to pay.
28   
Thus, the 
 
 
 
23.    499 U.S. 340, 353–54, 362 (1991). 
24.    See, e.g., Consumer Access to Information Act, H.R. 3872, 108th Cong. (2004); Database and 
Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003); Collections of Information 
Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999); Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, 
106th Cong. (1999); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997); Database 
Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996). 
25.    Database  producers  also  use  self-help  measures  (including  technological  measures)  to  prevent 
access or copying of databases.  The misappropriation tort also is an option but is restricted to time-sensitive 
databases.  In addition, the misappropriation tort is unreliable as it exists only in a few states and may very 
well be preempted (the Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue yet). 
26.    I choose to follow the Chicago School of Economics.   For an explanation, see ALAIN STROWEL, 
DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT 192 (1993). 
27.    See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS, 102–03 (2d ed. 1997); FRANÇOIS 
LÉVÊQUE & YANN MÉNIÈRE, THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT 4–7 (2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=642622; N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 224 (3d ed. 2002); 
RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY 3 (2000); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the 
Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL FACTORS 614–15 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Special Conference Series No. 13, 1962); 
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and 
Its  Predecessors,  82  COLUM. L. REV.  1600,  1611  (1982);  Roger  van  den  Bergh,  The  Role  and  Social 
Justification of Copyright: A “Law & Economics” Approach, 1998 INTELL. PROP. Q. 17, 20–21. 
28.    GUIBAULT, supra note 9, at 13.
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good benefits everyone.
29     
Since exclusion is impossible, the price system 
cannot be used because consumers have no incentive to pay.
30     
Non-payers 
essentially will get a free ride.
31   
Consequently, if not enough consumers pay, 
the good will not be produced because the producer cannot recoup the 
investment in making the good.
32    
Because public goods are non-excludable, 
private companies either will not produce public goods or will under-produce 
them (i.e., produce them in sub-optimal quantities).
33
 
A good is non-rivalrous when its consumption by one individual does not 
diminish that which remains available for others.
34     
Television or radio 
transmission, and any performance in front of an audience (e.g., fireworks, 
film, ballet, theatre, etc.), are typical non-rivalrous goods; having one more 
viewer  does  not  involve  an  additional  cost,  even  if  the  presence  of  an 
additional  viewer  means  there  is  additional  consumption  taking  place.
35
 
Because “the socially optimal price of a non-rival[rous] good or service is 
equal to the marginal cost of consumption—e.g., zero—private supply of the 
good is likely to be unprofitable.”
36    
Therefore, even though it is possible to 
produce non-rivalrous goods, private companies will produce sub-optimal 
quantities.
37
 
Thus, the production and consumption of public goods is characterized by 
underproduction (i.e., production below the socially optimal level) and 
overconsumption (free riding).
38     
This leads to an inefficient allocation of 
resources, also called market failure.
39   
Market failure may justify intervention 
by government or, if possible, by producers of the good themselves to achieve 
optimal supply of public goods.  There are several approaches to such remedial 
action.     First,  production  of  information  goods  can  be  given  to  public 
authorities, which can finance such production through taxes.
40   
However, this 
solution is not adopted (at least not generally) because in a democratic society 
works must be made outside of the state’s control: “[F]reedom from state 
control is essential lest freedom of expression be curtailed by fear of 
governmental  reprisal.”
41      
Another  way  to  cure  market  failure  is  to  use 
technical devices to render the goods private.   With digital technology, it is 
easier to control access to works so that information goods can become more 
private than public.
42   
However, as recent decisions have shown, technological 
protection devices are not infallible and can be cracked, suggesting that the 
 
 
29.    Id. 
30.    Id. 
31.    Id. 
32.    Id. 
33.    Id. at 13–14. 
34.    LÉVÊQUE & MÉNIÈRE, supra note 27, at 4. 
35.    GUIBAULT, supra note 9, at 14. 
36.    Id. 
37.    Id. 
38.    Id. 
39.    MANKIW, supra note 27, at 11, 154. 
40.    Gordon, supra note 27, at 1611–12. 
41.    Id. 
42.    STROWEL, supra note 26, at 204–05.
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efforts  of  intellectual property rights  holders  to  privatize their  information 
goods are not perfect.
43   
Therefore, state intervention through law (intellectual 
property law and the legal protection of technical devices that protect 
intellectual property-protected material) is still necessary to penalize infringing 
uses.  So far, enacting intellectual property rights such as patent, copyright, or 
the database sui generis right has proved the best mechanism for enabling 
creators to appropriate the fruits of their labor (by, for example, making 
information goods excludable) and for enhancing social welfare through more 
optimal private production of information goods. 
 
B.  Economics of Copyright Law 
 
In a landmark article, Landes and Posner employ this general economic 
analysis of intellectual property rights to analyze copyright law and to try to 
determine its optimal scope.
44   
Although Landes and Posner do not explain the 
effect of contracting out of copyright limits, they do explain why those limits 
make sense economically and what effects there are when those limits do not 
exist.
45    
Landes and Posner explain why, without limits to copyright, social 
welfare decreases.
46    
The conclusions of their analysis can be summarized as 
follows. 
The first limit is the non-protection of ideas.
47     
Monopolies on ideas 
create welfare loss.
48   
If every new author must come up with an original idea 
of his own because he cannot use the ideas of others, it takes more time and 
effort to create a work; hence, the number of works is reduced.
49   
This reduces 
social welfare.
50     
Therefore, it is economically efficient to protect only the 
expression of ideas. 
A   second   source   of   limits   to   copyright   comprises   exceptions   to 
 
 
43.    See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (involving a suit by 
several  motion picture studios  against a defendant  for  posting  on  the Internet  a computer  program that 
decrypted digitally encrypted movies). 
44.    William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 325, 361–63 (1989).   For other similar analyses, see generally Michael Lehmann, Property and 
Intellectual Property—Property Rights as Restrictions on Competition in Furtherance of Competition, 20 
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1 (1989); Michael Lehmann, The Theory of Property Rights and the 
Protection of Intellectual and Industrial Property, 16 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 525 (1985); 
Antoon A. Quaedvlieg, The Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Law, in INFORMATION LAW TOWARDS 
THE 21ST CENTURY 379 (Willem F. Korthals Altes et al. eds., 1992) (review and critique of the economics of 
intellectual property literature); van den Bergh, supra note 27. 
45.    See Landes & Posner, supra note 44, at 347–61. 
46.    Id. 
47.    Id. at 347. 
48.    Id. at 348. 
49.    Id.;  see  also  Ejan  Mackaay,  An  Economic  View  of  Information  Law,  in  INFORMATION  LAW 
TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 44, at 43, 56–57; van den Bergh, supra note 27, at 26–27 (“The 
higher the degree of protection, the higher the cost of new works.  Above a certain point copyright can become 
counterproductive, because of this increased cost.  By copyrighting only the expression and not the underlying 
idea, the above-mentioned problem can be contained.”). 
50.    Landes and Posner think that this, rather than an increase in price, is what happens; in traditional 
monopolies, both effects (reduction in the number of goods and increase in price) occur.  Landes & Posner, 
supra note 44, at 348.  They note that in a more complex model, the price of works would rise if ideas were 
protected. Id.
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copyright’s scope.
51   
In general, if any borrowing of the expression of a work 
is completely forbidden, the number of works will decrease.
52    
Thus, certain 
borrowings or uses of expression are economically efficient.   For instance, 
book reviews quoting brief passages of a work should be allowed.
53    
Even if 
publishers would be better off if they could act against unfavorable reviews, 
this would be to the detriment of book consumers.
54    
Landes and Posner also 
distinguish between productive and reproductive uses.
55    
On the one hand, a 
productive use lowers the costs of expression and thus reduces the cost of 
creating new works, thereby increasing the total number of works.
56    
On the 
other hand, a reproductive use reduces the demand for the protected work, 
“simply increas[ing] the number of ‘copies’ of a given work, reduc[ing] the 
gross profits of the author, and reduc[ing] the incentives to create works.”
57
 
For instance, if a parody reduces the demand for the original work, then it 
should be infringing and not fair use.
58    
Although it is uncertain whether the 
law has struck the right balance, it at least recognizes the problem, since ideas 
are not legally protectable and “substantial” rather than “simple” similarity is 
required for infringement.
59
 
A third limit to copyright’s scope is its term.
60    
The economic rationale 
for limiting the duration of copyright is to reduce, on the one hand, monopoly 
profits and, on the other hand, tracing costs.
61   
As Landes and Posner observe, 
“The longer the term, the fewer the number of works that are in the public 
domain, and therefore the higher . . . the cost of expression . . . will be.”
62
 
Accordingly, fewer works would be produced.   Again, social welfare is not 
enhanced. 
At  the  end  of  Landes  and  Posner’s  analysis,  it  is  clear  that  only 
expressions (and not ideas) should be protected, that only productive uses 
should be allowed, and that although we do not know what the exact length of 
copyright should be, it should not be too long and must be limited.
63    
Which 
 
 
51.    Id. at 357–60. 
52.    Id. at 360. 
53.    Id. at 358–59. 
54.    Id. at 359. 
55.    Id. at 360. 
56.    Id.  The costs of expression can be contrasted with the costs of production.  The former include the 
cost of creating the work (the author’s time and effort) “plus the cost of the publisher of soliciting and editing 
the manuscript and setting it in type.”  Id. at 327.  The costs of production are the costs of printing, binding, 
and distributing individual copies. Id. 
57.    Id. at 360. 
58.    Id. 
59.    Id. at 361. 
60.    Id. 
61.    Id. 
62.    Id. at 362.  In a more recent article, Landes and Posner changed their views and proposed an initially 
limited term that was indefinitely renewable upon payment of an initial and then renewed registration fees. 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 517–18 
(2003).  For many reasons (and by their own admission), the authors’ more recent article is much less strongly 
argued, and the model therein less economically efficient, than An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law.  It is 
not the purpose of this Article to criticize the authors’ more recent views; suffice it to say, I prefer their initial 
reasoning on the term’s length and adopt it here. 
63.    See Landes & Posner, supra note 44, at 347–63.
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productive uses are allowed under the economic analysis of copyright law? 
Productive uses include (brief) quotation and, to some extent, criticism, as is 
shown in Landes and Posner’s example concerning book reviews.
64     
Such 
exceptions to copyright are economically efficient.  In the same vein, parodies 
should be allowed, but not burlesques.
65    
Incidentally, those three uses allow 
freedom of speech.  What might be reproductive uses?  Some examples might 
include burlesques (because they reproduce the work and decrease the number 
of the original work created) and copying for news reporting, educational, and 
private uses.
66   
In these cases, either the copyright owner can refuse the use or 
make the user pay for it.
67   
This conclusion also is economically rational. 
However, this conclusion does not fully take into account several superior 
interests that exist in a democratic society, to which the right of the creator 
must bend.  News reporting, educational use, and private copying can be said 
to be reproductive uses, and thus under an economic analysis, must remain 
infringing uses.  However, to respect freedom of speech (which includes the 
right to impart and receive information
68
) and the right to privacy,
69  
both of 
which  underlie  these  limitations
70   
and  are  constitutionally  recognized  in 
Europe and the United States, such uses must be allowed.  If not, the copyright 
or sui generis right simply is illegal, as it does not respect human rights.  The 
human  rights  dimension,  therefore,  complements  the  economic  analysis. 
Human rights are as important as normative economic analysis, which insures 
an efficient allocation of resources.  The same analysis can be made and the 
same solution envisaged for other important interests that deserve protection in 
a democratic society, such as the dissemination of knowledge or facilitation of 
 
 
 
64.    Id. at 358–59. 
65.    Id. at 360. 
66.    Under an analysis of exceptions based on high transaction costs and market failure, private copying 
could be allowed.  See id. at 357.  However, these uses can sometimes be paid for under a licensing scheme 
and this can be economically efficient.  Id. at 358.  In addition, once transaction costs and the market failure 
disappear, these uses become marketable and, because they are reproductive, these uses should be bought.  See 
id. at 357–58. 
67.    Id. at 353–54.  For example, a burlesque is a derivative work and the owner of the underlying work 
has exclusive right over such derivatives. Id. at 360. 
68.    See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”); 
European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230 [hereinafter ECHR].  In 
Europe, the European Court of Human Rights has recognized the right.  See, e.g., Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 
14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357, 370 (1998); Gaskin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10454/83, 12 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 36, 51 (1989) (finding that access to information from the state to understand one’s childhood was 
granted, but on the basis of ECHR Article 8); Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, 
456 (1987).  In the United States, the right to information has been recognized in many cases.  See, e.g., Red 
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Martin v. 
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923). 
69.    ECHR, supra note 68, art. 8.   In the United States, the right to privacy is both a tort and a 
constitutional right.  The right has been implied from the “penumbra” of other fundamental rights that protect 
privacy interests.   See U.S. CONST. amends. I, III, IV, V, IX; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–99 n.23 
(1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
70.    Most certainly, the exceptions for reporting current events and criticism or review are grounded in 
promoting the free flow of information.   See Fiona Macmillan Patfield, Towards a Reconciliation of Free 
Speech and Copyright, in YEARBOOK OF MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW  213 (Eric Barendt et al. eds., 
1996).   The right to private copying is grounded in the right to privacy.   See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 31 (2004).
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public  access  to  information  and  culture.
71      
Some  reproductive  uses  that 
embody those interests are allowed in copyright legislation (e.g., uses by 
libraries, archives, museums, and persons suffering from a handicap, as well as 
uses for the needs of justice and of the state) but would be seen as inefficient 
under an economic analysis of copyright.
72    
However, such reproductive uses 
must be allowed in order to respect these superior interests because those uses 
aim to disseminate knowledge.
73   
As some have mentioned: 
[W]orks are not only goods whose creation and circulation must be 
facilitated by law, but also elements of the discourse of a collective 
society and of the constitution of a public space.  The dissemination of 
works and the collective wealth they generate are not reduced to the sole 
transactions visible on the market.
74
 
Creation of works allows persons to benefit from them without always entering 
into a contract with the author.  Some American authors now include ethical or 
justice considerations inside the economic analysis of law, which is sometimes 
seen as too rigid.
75
 
The intrusion of human rights and superior interests does not mean that 
reproductions can always be made for free, without compensating the right 
holder.  In fact, economic analysis surely would have such uses be subject to 
compensation if they cannot be restrained by the copyright holder.   Several 
ways exist to respect free speech, privacy, and other superior interests.   For 
instance, lawmakers can provide a compulsory license or a statutory license. 
In the first case, the user has no right to make use of the work without the prior 
authorization of the right holder, who is obliged to contract with the user 
(because of a duty to grant a license to those users who request one), and the 
price is determined through negotiations.
76    
If the negotiations break down, a 
third party resolves the issue.  Under a statutory license, the user is free to use 
the   work   without   authorization   provided   he   pays   a   price   generally 
predetermined in the statute (e.g., a tax on recording media or Internet 
connections for private copying).
77     
However, whether such uses should be 
allowed at a price or for free is a question beyond the scope of this Article. 
This  Article  is only concerned  with  the question  of whether  the limits  to 
database protection can be overridden by contract. 
 
 
 
71.    See  Mireille  Buydens  &  Séverine  Dusollier,  Les  exceptions  au  droit  d’auteur:  évolutions 
dangereuses, 9 COMMUNICATION COMMERCE ÉLECTRONIQUE 9, 13 (2001) (Fr.); Thomas C. Vinje, Copyright 
Imperilled, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 192, 193 (1999). 
72.    See Vinje, supra note 71, at 192–93. 
73.    See id. at 193. 
74.    SÉVERINE DUSOLLIER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET PROTECTION DES OEUVRES DANS L’UNIVERS NUMÉRIQUE 
282 (2005) (translation by the author). 
75.    See generally Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish?   Economic Analysis, Price 
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in 
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996). 
76.    GUIBAULT, supra note 9, at 25. 
77.    Id. at 22–23.
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C.  Economics of Investment in Database Creation 
 
From an economic point of view, investment in database creation is 
broadly similar to creation of copyright works.  If someone creates a database 
at a cost (investment), this person ought to be protected against copying of the 
contents of the database (information).   If not, because the contents of the 
database (information) are a public good, underproduction of databases will 
result.   Thus, the economic analysis of copyright law can be applied to 
investment in database creation.  First, in order to obtain protection, there must 
be an investment.  If there is no cost in producing the database, there is nothing 
to protect.   As with copyright, productive use of the data constituting the 
database should be allowed while reproductive uses should be forbidden,
78 
except  those  that  protect  freedom  of  speech,  privacy,  and  other  superior 
interests (e.g., private copying, educational use, use by libraries, archives, 
museums, persons suffering from a handicap, and uses for the needs of justice 
and of the state).   Finally, since protection must be temporary to avoid the 
negative effects of monopolies in static situations, protection must be limited 
in time.  Besides, after a period of time, the investment normally is recouped, 
and there is no reason to continue protecting the result of the investment as 
reflected in the database contents; no incentive is granted anymore, but rent- 
seeking is promoted.
79
 
The sui generis right presents, however, major differences with copyright 
depending on the type of database protected.   First, let us look at copyright. 
Copyright protects only original expression.  By definition, original expression 
is unique because it is created by man.  Every novel, music, film, or other such 
work will have its own unique original expression.  It is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, for another to come up with an identical song or story 
independently.  In other words, it will be an uphill struggle for a second creator 
whose work is identical or very similar to the first-created work to prove that 
the  work  he  created  was  made  independently  if  the  first-created  work 
previously was accessible to the public.  Thus, every copyright holder holds an 
economic monopoly on its creation because every original expression is, by 
definition, created by man and not preexisting.
80    
With this monopoly, a 
copyright holder can prevent others from copying its original expression but 
not the ideas or the unoriginal expressions behind its work.  This monopoly is 
not very powerful since it does not protect ideas, information, facts, or 
unoriginal expressions.  Despite such limits, the copyright monopoly exists and 
can lead to abuse.   Such potential abuses, therefore, must be prevented. 
Solutions have been proposed by Guibault, some of which I will consider 
 
 
 
 
78.    Cf. discussion supra Part III.B.   This would include using the data for criticism and parody and 
using insubstantial parts of the data for quotation purposes. 
79.    Rent-seeking is “the excessive search by certain economic agents for monopoly-related profits 
(economic rents).”  Van den Bergh, supra note 27, at 26. 
80.    Of course, the legal monopoly granted by copyright facilitates the realization of this economic 
monopoly.
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later.
81
 
How does protecting investment in database creation differ from 
copyright?   As noted above, copyright creates only one situation: economic 
monopoly.  With the sui generis right, two different situations resulting from 
two  different  types  of  databases  can  be  distinguished:  multiple-source 
databases and sole-source databases.   Let us first look at multiple-source 
databases.  A multiple-source database is a database made of preexisting public 
domain data that the database producer collects.  The database producer has no 
economic   monopoly.       Anyone   can   make   the   exact   same   database 
independently by collecting the exact same elements in the public domain, and 
it would be easy for a second database producer to prove that it had invested in 
making its database without copying; the second database producer just needs 
to keep records of its investments in collecting, verifying, or presenting the 
data.   In this case, the situation is thus totally different from the situation in 
copyright law, and the reasoning and solutions found for copyright cannot be 
applied in their entirety.  Under Landes and Posner’s analysis, ideas must not 
be  monopolized  because  such  monopolization  reduces  social  welfare.
82
 
Although they do not make the same reasoning for raw information or facts, it 
safely can be said by analogy that granting a monopoly on information or facts 
also reduces social welfare.  In the case of sui generis protection of multiple- 
source databases, however, the intellectual property protection does not grant a 
monopoly on information or facts.   Thus, no problem of welfare loss exists. 
Therefore,  protection  should  be  granted  to  producers  of  multiple-source 
databases under the same conditions as for copyright. 
The situation is quite different with sole-source databases.  In this case, 
the database is made of created data.   This data are not preexisting but are 
produced by the database producer itself.  Sole-source information, like ideas, 
exists only if a created piece of information is unique, as when a singular idea 
is created by an individual.  In this case, the database producer has a de facto 
economic monopoly on all the information contained in its database.   Since 
granting a monopoly on information or facts reduces social welfare, an 
intellectual  property  right  in  single  pieces  of  information  should  not  be 
granted.   Consider, however, a collection of several pieces of information. 
There is a tension between market failure and welfare loss.  In some cases, it 
may be important to grant a right on a database for a short period and under 
tight conditions in order to induce production of information.  Some protection 
seems necessary to induce the production of collections of information.  The 
intellectual property right (legal monopoly or exclusive right) can be granted if 
there has been investment in making the database, but it must be tightly 
regulated  since  it  creates  a  de  facto  economic  monopoly.     Access  to 
information must not be prevented; thus, refusals to grant access, access under 
abusive conditions, and abusive prices must be prohibited.  With the results of 
this analysis in mind, we can examine whether and under which conditions 
 
 
81.    See infra Part IV.A.2. 
82.    Landes & Posner, supra note 44, at 348.
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database producers can protect their databases’ contents by contract over and 
above the legal protection granted by the database sui generis right. 
 
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
A.  Contractual Protection of Databases Protected by the Sui Generis Right 
 
Article 13 of the Database Directive provides that the holder of the sui 
generis right on a database may protect its database additionally by contract.
83
 
However,  the  Database  Directive  offers  no  more  detail  than  this.
84      
The 
question  that  remains  is  whether  the  database  maker  can  obtain  more 
protection by contract than the protection granted by the sui generis right. 
Parties to a contract have complete freedom as to their contract’s content
85 
so 
long as the contract is not abusive and does not breach competition law, the 
law on unfair contract terms, or constitutional rights.
86    
Therefore, provided 
that a database producer meets those tests, the database producer can, in order 
to gain more protection than the sui generis right, restrict or eliminate the 
limits of the protection, i.e., broaden the term or restrict or eliminate the free 
extraction or reutilization of insubstantial parts, the principle of exhaustion, or 
all or some of the exceptions.   Database producers can accomplish this by 
standard-form contract or by a fully negotiated contract.
87
 
However, the analysis  does not  end  there.   When a contract is  fully 
negotiated, the two parties have equal bargaining power and contracting parties 
will agree to restrictions on their rights only if they receive an advantageous 
counterpart.
88   
The case of adhesion contracts is different.  First, such contracts 
generally are drafted unilaterally by producers and destined to a weaker party, 
such as the consumer or end-user of a product.
89    
They are take-it-or-leave-it 
contracts in the sense that the consumer has no choice but to accept the 
conditions of the contract en bloc or else not adhere.
90     
In addition, such 
contracts often contain clauses binding subsequent users of the product, i.e., 
not just the original acquirer.
91   
Therefore, rights created by these contracts are 
 
 
 
83.    Database Directive, supra note 11, art. 13. 
84.    In its entirety, Article 13 provides: 
Continued application of other legal provisions: This Directive shall be without prejudice to provisions 
concerning in particular copyright, rights related to copyright or any other rights or obligations subsisting 
in the data, works or other materials incorporated into a database, patent rights, trade marks, design 
rights, the protection of national treasures, laws on restrictive practices and unfair competition, trade 
secrets, security, confidentiality, data protection and privacy, access to public documents, and the law of 
contract. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
85.    See GUIBAULT, supra note 9, at 114 (explaining this principle). 
86.    Id. at 194–96. 
87.    Id. at 112–20. 
88.    Id. at 198–99. 
89.    Id. at 120. 
90.    Id. 
91.    Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 93, 103–04 (1997).
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extremely similar if not identical to rights against the world and can be said to 
constitute private legislation.
92     
Intellectual products, regardless of whether 
intellectual property rights also protect them, increasingly are sold in this 
manner.  Such contracts commonly appear as shrink-wrap licenses for offline 
products or click-wrap or click-through licenses for online products.  Not only 
have such contracts become widespread, but they often look very similar, 
thereby restricting potential choice for the consumer.
93     
Therefore, such 
contracts can be said to be as efficient as intellectual property rights, and even 
more so if they override the limits of intellectual property rights.   Thus, a 
distinction must be drawn between traditional contracts and these latter types 
of contract. 
Article 15 of the Database Directive partially addresses whether holders 
of the sui generis right can use contract to obtain protection beyond the scope 
of that right.
94   
Article 15 provides that “[a]ny contractual provision contrary to 
Articles  6(1)  and  8  shall  be  null  and  void.”
95       
Article  15  thus  renders 
imperative Article 8, which sets forth the rights of lawful users to extract and 
reutilize insubstantial parts of a publicly available database.
96   
This means that 
the database producer cannot override Article 8 by contract, regardless of the 
contract type.  In other words, the database producer cannot prevent a lawful 
user from extracting or reutilizing insubstantial parts of the database.   Only 
when the lawful user extracts or reutilizes insubstantial parts that collectively 
amount to a substantial part or the entire database may the database producer 
exercise its right.   In sum, Article 15 makes it absolutely impossible for the 
maker of any type of database to prevent, at least as to lawful users, extraction 
or reutilization of insubstantial parts of the database, so long as the sum of 
insubstantial parts (if several are taken) does not amount to a substantial part. 
The question, then, would appear to be whether this legal provision is 
economically efficient.   This question is addressed below for both multiple- 
source and sole-source databases.
97
 
Consider, though, that Article 15 impliedly permits contract to override 
the  optional  exceptions  and  other  limits  (exhaustion  and  term),  as  neither 
 
 
92.    See id. at 103–04 (“In fact, a contract may be formed whenever the potential licensee acts in a way 
defined as an acceptance by the offeror (the master of the offer).  If that method of acceptance is defined by 
ProCD to be the use of the software, then any stranger who finds the CD-ROM in the street and uses it would 
become  a  party  to  the  license  agreement.    In  other  words,  if  the  standard  of  assent  necessary  to  form 
contractual relationships is minimal, then no unlicensed access to works will be possible.  The outcome will be 
very similar to the effect of a right in rem.”); Garry L. Founds, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or 
Not 2B?, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 116 (1999); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis 
Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 167 (1997); Dennis S. 
Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511, 540 (1997); 
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1274 n.158 (1995) 
[hereinafter  Lemley,  IP  and  Shrinkwrap  Licenses];  Mark  A.  Lemley,  Shrinkwraps  in  Cyberspace,  35 
JURIMETRICS J. 311, 319–20 (1995) [hereinafter Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace]; David Nimmer et al., 
The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 19, 60 (1999). 
93.    Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, supra note 92, at 319. 
94.    Database Directive, supra note 11, art. 15. 
95.    Id. 
96.    Id. art. 8 
97.    See infra Part IV.A.1–.2.
114 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & POLICY [Vol. 2005 
No. 2] THE CONTRACTUAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES 114 
 
 
 
 
Article 15 nor any other article of the Database Directive renders such 
exceptions or limits imperative.   Therefore, the question is whether this 
overprotects the database producer’s investment in making the database.  Since 
the  economic  situation  is  different  for  multiple-source  and  sole-source 
databases, this question is again addressed for each separately.
98
 
 
1.  Multiple-Source Databases 
 
If the database is not sole-source, by definition the data in it are in the 
public   domain,   and   anyone   can   make   a   database   out   of   that   data 
independently.
99   
The first database producer to make such a database will face 
competition.  Knowing it will face competition, the database producer will not 
include terms in its contracts that unduly restrict access to data.  Similarly, the 
database producer will not charge a price above the cost of its investment and a 
reasonable return or profit, which amounts to the same investment and profit 
that anyone needs to make to market the same database.  A different approach 
will subject the database producer to market entry and competition.   That it 
may be an advantage, and thus give market power, to be the first database 
producer on the specific market does not take away the fact that the “credible 
threat of a new market entrant is a powerful constraint on the ability of firms to 
exercise  their  market  power.”
100       
For  example,  if  the  database  producer 
provides that substantial parts of the database cannot be reused at all forever, 
the user will not enter into the license agreement but will enter a license 
agreement with another database producer who does not prevent the use of 
insubstantial parts and only prevents the reutilization of substantial parts of the 
database only for the fifteen-year term.  If there is no competitor, the potential 
database  user  will  seek  the  data  in  the  public  domain.    Similarly,  if  the 
database producer does not allow the extraction of a substantial part of the 
database  for  private  purposes,  the  user  will  look  elsewhere.    This  is  true 
whether  the  user  is  a  professional  or  a  private  party;  people  are  used  to 
shopping around.  In the case of analog databases, e.g., dictionaries, a range of 
similar databases can be found in the same place in a bookshop, and it will be 
easy to compare prices and conditions.  With online databases, it is also easy 
for a user to find the best deal.   Some Web sites now devote themselves 
entirely to price comparisons (and this could include comparison of terms of 
use) between products, thereby helping users to decide what is best for them.
101
 
Of course, competition itself does not prevent the use of restrictive clauses.  If 
a user wishes only to use the database’s contents for some restricted purpose 
and  agrees,  for  example,  not  to  criticize  the  data  or  even  not  to  reuse 
 
 
 
98.    See infra Part IV.B.1–.2. 
99.    See Laura D’Andrea Tyson & Edward F. Sherry, Statutory Protection for Databases: Economic and 
Public Policy Issues (Oct. 23, 1997) (unpublished report, on file with the author). 
100.    Id. sec. 4.1 
101.    See, e.g., Froogle, http://www.froogle.google.co.uk (last visited May 23, 2006); Pricerunner UK, 
http://www.pricerunner.co.uk (last visited May 23, 2006); PriceSCAN, http://www.pricescan.com (last visited 
May 23, 2006).
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insubstantial parts in order to get the data for a cheaper price, this is not a 
problem.  Since competition exists, it leaves open the possibility for other users 
to get the data at a reasonable price with the guarantee that the limits of the sui 
generis  right  are  respected.     As  long  as  the  consumer  has  the  choice, 
competition is preserved. 
Thus, if the database is not sole-source, competition exists, at least 
potentially.  This means that users potentially can have access to other similar 
or identical databases.  If there is only one database on the market, it can be 
assumed that the price and conditions of use are competitive since the database 
maker knows it will face competition if it makes its price and conditions 
objectionable to the user.   In this scenario, then, prices should be low and 
conditions of access reasonable.  Therefore, contractual protection of multiple- 
source databases already protected by the sui generis right does not overprotect 
databases.   This is true whatever the type of contract (fully negotiated or 
adhesion)  because  there  is  competition  in  the  market.    Article  15  of  the 
Database Directive, then, is economically efficient albeit unnecessary.  A legal 
provision prohibiting the overriding of limits to the sui generis right is not 
necessary because the market is itself efficient (i.e., there is no market failure 
and no state intervention is needed).  A user is free to accept a contract that 
overrides some limits if the user so wishes.  In this case, the user generally will 
request an advantage (e.g., a lower price) in exchange for any such restriction. 
However, Article 15 makes this impossible for insubstantial parts.   This is 
unnecessary and overly restrictive of parties’ contractual freedom. 
There remains, however, a potential competition problem that needs to be 
briefly addressed.  Several database producers of similar databases may agree 
between themselves to fix prices or conditions.  For this, there already exists a 
remedy: Article 81 of the European Community Treaty (EC Treaty).
102    
This 
provision  of competition  law  prohibits agreements  and  concerted practices 
between undertakings that may affect trade between member states, the object 
or  effect  of  which  is  to  prevent  or  distort  competition  in  the  European 
Union.
103   
Such agreements and practices include the fixing of prices or other 
trading conditions.
104     
Article 81 renders such agreements and practices 
automatically void.
105
 
 
2.  Sole-Source Databases 
 
For  sole-source  databases,  there  is  both  a  legal  and  an  economic 
monopoly.   The user has no real choice; unable to get the information 
elsewhere, the user must deal with the single database producer and either 
accept the price and conditions or have no access to the information.  In the 
case of such a monopoly on data, the situation is at once similar and dissimilar 
 
 
102.    Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 81, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3, available 
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301.html [hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
103.    Id. 
104.    Id. 
105.    Id.
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to copyright: similar in that an economic monopoly exists, and dissimilar in 
that the object of the monopoly is different.   Copyright’s monopoly is on 
original expression, whereas the sui generis right monopoly is on information. 
If a work (e.g., a book on copyright law) is protected by copyright, the legal 
monopoly protects only the original expression, and anyone can create another 
book on copyright law using a different original expression.  Such a monopoly 
is not as great as a monopoly on raw information, as under the sui generis 
right.   The user who finds a copyright textbook too expensive could buy a 
similar textbook for a lower price; because there is some substitutability 
between works, there is some competition (monopolistic competition).  Such 
substitutability does not exist in the case of a sole-source database protected by 
the sui generis right.  Thus, the solution in this case must be at least identical or 
even more radical than under copyright law. 
Let us look at each limit.  With regard to the limit of the non-protection of 
insubstantial parts, the imperativeness of this limit provided in Article 15 is 
economically efficient and, in this case, both useful and necessary.  This is true 
for fully negotiated and adhesion contracts, as the user has no choice in either 
case due to the monopoly.  Any user, be it a professional or a private party, has 
weak bargaining power since, by definition, there is no competition in the 
market.  Thus, any contract, including contracts at arm’s length, will be take-it- 
or-leave-it, potentially taking away even the rights of the user provided by the 
sui generis right law. 
With regard to the exceptions to the sui generis right, Guibault’s analysis 
of contractual overridability of exceptions to the copyright holder’s exclusive 
rights is useful.
106     
The analysis developed in her thesis shows that neither 
copyright itself nor any other external laws that can regulate it (e.g., civil law 
(abuse of rights), consumer protection law, competition law, and constitutional 
law)  provides  an  adequate  means  to  ensure  that  a  copyright  holder  that 
overrides copyright limitations will respect copyright goals.
107    
Although the 
sui generis right is too recent to be envisaged in those laws, this conclusion 
similarly can be drawn a fortiori for the sui generis right.  Guibault explains 
that contracts that restrict copyright limitations upset the balance struck by 
every copyright regime, between creators’ and users’ rights.
108   
This applies for 
the sui generis right as well.   Guibault then distinguishes between adhesion 
contracts and fully negotiated contracts that restrict copyright exceptions.
109
 
As argued above, because there is no competition in the case of a monopoly on 
information, this distinction is not valid; all contracts are take-it-or-leave-it. 
Thus, only Guibault’s analysis concerning adhesion contracts is applicable for 
our purposes. 
Guibault proposes two solutions to the problem of restrictive adhesion 
contracts.  One solution is to render imperative the most important limitations 
 
 
 
106.    See generally GUIBAULT, supra note 9. 
107.    Id. at 302–03. 
108.    Id. at 194–96. 
109.    Id. at 198–213.
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to copyright, i.e., those that preserve free competition and the user’s freedom 
of expression.
110   
Those limitations include the right to make reproductions for 
criticism,  review,  research,  and  parody.
111      
Another  solution  would  be  to 
“extend the regulations concerning unfair consumer contract terms to cover 
copyright  matters.”
112      
In  this  second  solution,  terms  in  a  standard  form 
contract would be presumed unfair if they departed from provisions of the 
relevant copyright law.
113    
This second solution, however, seems less certain, 
legally speaking.  A provision making some limits imperative, as in Guibault’s 
first solution, is clear-cut: in every case, the contract term would be illegal. 
Thus,  legal  certainty  is  increased,  and  there  is  no  need  for  litigation;  a 
defendant who is sure to lose will not engage in proceedings.  If the second 
solution is followed, however, litigation may be necessary, as it will likely be 
the duty of the judge to decide if the term presumed unfair is indeed unfair in 
each case.   This solution might be better suited to copyright than to the sui 
generis right.  In the case of sole-source databases protected by the sui generis 
right, we are dealing with monopolies on information, and such monopolies 
give much more power than a monopoly on original expression.  Therefore, the 
first solution (imperativeness of limitations) seems preferable. 
Applying Guibault’s second solution—the presumption of unfairness—to 
contract terms that govern the use of sole-source databases (which also are 
protected by the sui generis right) but depart from the relevant copyright law at 
first entails making the exception for research and teaching imperative.   In 
addition,  an  exception  for  private  purposes  arguably  should  be  made 
imperative, out of respect for the human right to privacy.  The third exception, 
allowing extraction and reutilization for public security or an administrative or 
judicial procedure, also should be made imperative because it protects superior 
interests of the state.  This has been done, however, in only one E.U. member 
state, Belgium, and applies to all databases (i.e., the provision does not 
distinguish     between     multiple-source     and     sole-source     databases).
114
 
Additionally, the Database Directive should be revised to include exceptions 
both for criticism or review and for news reporting, to respect the human right 
of freedom of speech.   To ensure that this right is protected, the exceptions 
should be made imperative in the case of sole-source databases.   This 
imperativeness means that the producer of a sole-source database cannot refuse 
access to a substantial part of the contents of the database when the exceptions 
apply, but it does not mean that in every case the data must be available for 
free.  The desirability of asking a price is more economically justified when the 
use is reproductive rather than productive.  Because economic analysis cannot 
 
 
 
110.    Id. at 304. These are the only exceptions Guibault thinks should be made imperative. Id. 
111.    Id. 
112.    Id. 
113.    Id. 
114.    Wet houdende omzetting in Belgisch gerechtelijk recht van de Europese richtlijn van 11 maart 1996 
betreffende de rechtsbescherming van databanken [Law Transposing to Belgian Legislation the European 
Directive of 11 March 1996 Concerning the Legal Protection of Databases] art. 11, Belgisch Staatsblad [B.S.] 
[Official Gazette of Belgium], Nov. 11, 1998, p. 36,913.
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yet provide a more precise answer to this question, it will remain a matter of 
choice for the lawmaker. 
The above analysis answers the question with regard to the exceptions to 
the sui generis right where the database producer is a monopolist.   Because 
copyright commentators have limited their analyses to exceptions to copyright 
rights,
115 
there is no detailed examination so far with regard to other limits (i.e., 
exhaustion and term).  It is submitted that the economic analysis of copyright 
law provides an answer to whether these other limits to copyright, which also 
exist in sui generis right law, can be overridden.  This argument based on the 
economics of copyright can be applied by analogy to the sui generis right. 
As for the term, the producer of a sole-source database protected by the 
sui generis  right   should not be  able  to  extend the term of  protection by 
contract.  It would not be economically efficient to do so.  This holds true for 
both an extension limited in time (e.g., fifty years instead of fifteen years) and 
an extension unlimited in time (perpetual protection).  In addition, in copyright 
law, the term can also be said to be based on the right to free speech, and thus, 
should not be capable of being overridden.  This rationale is the same for the 
sui generis right.  Therefore, the limit of the sui generis right term should be 
made imperative in the case of sole-source databases. 
What about the exhaustion principle?  Landes and Posner did not analyze 
the question of exhaustion.  However, it can be said that to restrict or eliminate 
transfers would block trade and be economically inefficient.   Preventing 
application   of   the   exhaustion   principle   through   contracts   would   mean 
economic standstill.   If persons were barred from transferring copies, the 
freedom of commerce would be deeply affected.   It would mean the end of 
second-hand bookshops, a prohibition on making gifts, and, in some cases, 
even the end of commercial deals (just think of the markets for sculptures and 
paintings).  In any case, it seems that it is illegal to override this intellectual 
property principle in at least two ways.  First, some national courts have held 
that it was illegal to override it.  Twice, for example, the Dutch Supreme Court 
has ruled that a restriction preventing redistribution of a work in contradiction 
with the exhaustion principle was ineffective.
116    
German courts have handed 
down similar decisions on the basis of a higher principle established in the 
federal   constitution.
117         
Second,   it   seems   that   restrictions   concerning 
 
 
115.    See GUIBAULT, supra note 9, at 6; Buydens & Dusollier, supra note 71, at 13; Vinje, supra note 71, 
at 192–94. 
116.  Stemra/Free Record Shop B.V., Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands], 20  november  1987, NJ  1988, 280  (ann. LWH)  (Neth.);  N.V. Drukkerij “de Spaarnestad”/ 
Leesinrichting “Favoriet,” Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], 25 januari 
1952, NJ 1952, 95 (ann. DJV) (Neth.); see GUIBAULT, supra note 9, 222–23. 
117.  Landgericht München [LG München] [Munich Trial Court] June 9, 1983, 85 Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 763, 1983 (F.R.G.).   Later courts confirmed this decision, which 
concerned a notice preventing persons from renting a sound recording.  Id. at (763).  The court of first instance 
ruled that the copyright owner cannot prevent the renting of a work put on the market by that owner.  Id. at 
(764).   Under Article 27(1) of the German copyright law, however, rights holders are entitled to receive 
remuneration for the rental.  Id.  The federal supreme court opined that if a rights holder were able to prevent 
the further distribution of the works, it would impede the free circulation of goods in an unacceptable manner. 
Id.  The explanatory memorandum to the German copyright law bill of 1965 stated that the legislature did not
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exhaustion of any intellectual property right would run afoul of the principle of 
free movement of goods and services as established in Articles 28 and 29 of 
the EC Treaty.
118
 
In conclusion, the producer of a sole-source database should not be able 
to extend the term of sui generis protection or eliminate or restrict the principle 
of exhaustion.  Those limits need to be made imperative in legislation, and the 
Database Directive should be revised to this effect. 
 
B.  Contractual Protection of Databases Not Protected by the Sui Generis 
Right 
 
The second question this Article attempts to answer is whether it is 
economically efficient, and therefore not overprotective, that a database maker 
be allowed to contractually protect a database that is not protected by the sui 
generis right, either because it was protected but has now fallen in the public 
domain, or because it does not meet the requirements to be protected by the sui 
generis right.  The same distinction between multiple-source and sole-source 
databases must be made. 
 
1.  Multiple-Source Databases 
 
A database producer protecting a multiple-source database by any type of 
contract will face competition because the data remains freely available.  The 
situation will be exactly the same for databases that have fallen into the public 
domain  and  those  that  cannot  be  protected  by  the  sui  generis  right. 
Competition will drive prices down, and conditions will be reasonable.  Again, 
there may be collusions between producers of similar databases to fix prices or 
conditions, but this is regulated by Article 81 of the EC Treaty.
119   
There will 
be no overprotection. 
 
2.  Sole-Source Databases 
 
If a sole-source database once was protected but now has fallen into the 
public domain, it is, by definition, available to anyone, and the situation is 
similar to that of a multiple-source database described above.  But if the sole- 
source database cannot be protected by the sui generis right, the database 
producer is a monopolist. 
Two situations can be identified.   First, a database may have required 
some investment but not enough to trigger the sui generis right.  This situation 
will be rare, but not impossible, since the requisite level of investment is rather 
low.
120    
Second, the database may not have required any investment.  This is 
 
 
intend to allow restrictions on the distribution right.  Id.  The distribution right does not allow the rights holder 
to monitor the use of the work once lawfully put on the market.  Id. 
118.    EC Treaty, supra note 102, arts. 28–29. 
119.    Id. art. 81. 
120.    For  a  discussion,  see  Estelle  Derclaye,  Database  Sui  Generis  Right:  What  Is  a  Substantial
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the case of most spin-off databases that are by-products of a principal activity. 
Well-known examples of such databases include football and horse-racing 
fixtures like those in the Fixtures Marketing and British Horseracing Board 
cases.
121   
Other examples include television listings, event schedules, and train 
and plane timetables.  In those cases, a distinction must be made between fully 
negotiated and adhesion contracts.  With a fully negotiated contract, the sole- 
source database producer does not bind third parties, so it is not adequately 
protected.  Anyone can reproduce the information except the contracting party, 
and  thus  no  fear  of  overprotection  exists.    Using  an  adhesion  contract, 
however, will amount to private legislation as strong as an intellectual property 
right.  Therefore, if such a contract overrides the limits of the sui generis right, 
it will be overprotective. 
It should be noted, however, that it seems contrary to the economics of 
information  goods  combined  with  the  human  rights  approach  to  allow 
producers of databases that have not required any investment to get protection 
similar to intellectual property rights through adhesion contracts.  Because the 
database producer has not invested, it does not deserve protection as an 
incentive to create a database.  The database is a mere by-product of an activity 
for which the producer receives compensation.   For instance, a television 
company’s aim is to organize programs, i.e., to decide which program is shown 
at which time.   Program listings are a result of this activity.   The television 
company receives financial compensation for showing programs through, for 
example, television licenses and advertising.  Thus, its investment is recouped. 
Allowing such database producers to get sui generis right protection for their 
data is rewarding them for an effort they have not made.  It is overprotecting 
them  and  prevents  the  public  from  having  access  to  these  data.     This 
conclusion is in line with the economic analysis of information goods and the 
Database Directive, the aim of which is to promote and protect investment.  If 
a sole-source database has not required an investment, it does not deserve 
protection, be it by intellectual property right  or by contractual  protection 
amounting, in effect, to such a right.
122
 
 
 
Investment?  A Tentative Definition, 36 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 2 (2005). 
121.    Case C-46/02, Fixtures Mktg. Ltd. v. Oy Veikkaus AB, 2004 E.C.R. I-10,365; Case C-203/02, 
British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org., 2004 E.C.R. I-10,415; Case C-338/02, Fixtures Mktg. Ltd. 
v. Svenska Spel AB, 2004 E.C.R. I-10,497; Case C-444/02, Fixtures Mktg. Ltd. v. Organismos Prognostikon 
Agonon Podosfairou AE, 2004 E.C.R. I-10,549.  For commentary, see Tanya Aplin, The ECJ Elucidates the 
Database Right, 2005  INTELL. PROP. Q. 204;  Mark  Davison  & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Football Fixtures, 
Horseraces and Spin Offs: The ECJ Domesticates the Database Right, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 113; 
Estelle Derclaye, The Court of Justice Interprets the Database Sui Generis Right for the First Time, 30 EUR. L. 
REV. 420 (2005).   In the four similar cases above, the European Court of Justice ruled that a substantial 
investment in creating data does not trigger the sui generis right.   There must be a separate substantial 
investment in collecting, presenting, or verifying the data.  This leaves many spin-off databases unprotectable 
by the sui generis right.  For an explanation of the spin-off theory, see Estelle Derclaye, Databases Sui Generis 
Right: Should We Adopt the Spin-off Theory?, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 402, 402–12 (2004); P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz, The “Spin-Off” Doctrine in the Netherlands and Elsewhere in Europe, Paper Presented at 11th 
Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy, Fordham University School of Law, 
New York (Apr. 14–25, 2003), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/spinofffordham.html. 
122.    Of course, this leaves intact contractual protection by confidence (or trade secret protection as it is 
called in the United States).
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V. THE UNITED STATES 
 
As introduced earlier, American producers of uncopyrightable databases 
can and often do use contracts to secure protection of their compilation efforts. 
Parties to a contract have complete freedom as to their contract’s content, so 
long as it does not breach competition law, the law on unfair contract terms, or 
constitutional rights and is not abusive.
123   
Therefore, provided (as is assumed 
here) that American database producers do not breach any of those laws, they 
can secure absolute protection of their database.  For example, producers can 
protect a database that has not required any investment; prohibit the use of 
insubstantial parts; prohibit the use of substantial parts for teaching, research, 
or other purposes; prohibit further transfers of the database; or secure indefinite 
protection.  Contracts providing for such protections can be called restrictive 
since they bypass the limits of a hypothetical American intellectual property 
right comparable to the European sui generis right.  The question is whether 
such restrictive contracts overprotect American database producers.  The same 
distinction made in Part IV between fully negotiated and adhesion contracts 
must be made here. 
 
A.  Fully Negotiated Contracts 
 
Fully negotiated contracts, even if they are restrictive, will never be 
overprotective.  In fact, they always will be underprotective.  Because of the 
privity principle, such contracts do not bind third parties.  Unlike intellectual 
property rights, they lack erga omnes power.  Since such contracts do not bind 
subsequent users, they underprotect the database producer because they do not 
allow producers to act against third parties who reproduce or make available 
the whole or substantial parts of the protected database.  This is valid for both 
sole-source and multiple-source databases. 
 
B.  Adhesion Contracts 
 
As observed in Part IV.A, adhesion contracts are extremely close, if not 
identical, to rights against the world and can be said to constitute private 
legislation similar to state law.
124   
Therefore, they can be said to be as efficient 
as intellectual property rights and more so if they override the limits of 
intellectual property rights.  So long as database producers do not override the 
limits of a potential right similar to the sui generis right in their adhesion 
contracts, such contracts can, at this stage, be seen as a good alternative to 
specific database legislation. 
A distinction must now be made between producers of sole-source and 
 
 
 
123.    GUIBAULT, supra note 9, at 194–96. 
124.    Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Dyk, J., dissenting); Elkin- 
Koren, supra note 91, at 103–04; Founds, supra note 92, at 115; Ginsburg, supra note 92, at 167; Karjala, 
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multiple-source databases.   In the case of a multiple-source database, by 
definition there will be competition in the market, and the adhesion contract 
will not override the limits of adequate database protection.  But in the case of 
a sole-source database, chances are high that the contract will override those 
limits.  Database producers in monopoly positions know that end-users have no 
choice but to accept conditions because they lack substitute products.  In this 
case, contractual protection will be overprotective. 
In either case, though, adhesion contracts that provide database protection 
equivalent to copyright and, a fortiori, those that provide even more protection 
may be preempted by § 301 of the Copyright Act.   Courts are split on this 
issue,
125  
which makes the availability of contract law as a means to protect 
databases very unreliable.   In addition, even if such contracts survive 
preemption by § 301, they still must survive preemption by the Supremacy 
Clause.
126       
Until  the  Supreme  Court  rules  on  these  issues,  the  law  is 
uncertain.
127
 
Thus, fully negotiated contracts underprotect databases while most 
adhesion contracts overprotect databases, though the federal and constitutional 
validity of adhesion contacts overriding copyright limits in the United States 
remains uncertain. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Because competition (potentially) will exist in markets for preexisting 
data, there will be no overprotection problems with databases protected or not 
protected by the sui generis right (or a potential equivalent right in the United 
States), the data of  which  are preexisting.   This is because such data are 
available to anyone, and anyone can make a database from them.  Thus, the 
law need not specifically provide that limits to the sui generis right must be 
made  imperative  for  multiple-source  databases.    The  market  will  regulate 
 
 
125.    There are two main conflicting precedents.  Compare Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 
255 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that state law overriding copyright limits and shrink-wrap license based on it was 
preempted), with ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that shrink-wrap license 
protecting uncopyrightable database by restricting use of the database to noncommercial purposes was not 
preempted because contracts grant rights different from rights granted by the Copyright Act), and Bowers, 320 
F.3d at 1337 (shrink-wrap license prohibiting reverse engineering of copyrighted software not preempted). 
See also Lemley, IP and Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 92, at 1256. 
126.    In ProCD, the court did not analyze the issue.   If the analysis in Vault were applied to ProCD’s 
facts, the license may well have been preempted under the Supremacy Clause.  GUIBAULT, supra note 9, at 235 
(citing Nimmer et al., supra note 92, at 63; Karjala, supra note 92, at 540).   This is because ProCD was 
restricting the use of facts that both the Supreme Court (in the Feist case) and Congress (in the Copyright Act) 
decided to leave unprotected. Id. 
127.    ProCD influenced the drafting of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA). 
GUIBAULT, supra note 9, at 233.  This proposed uniform law allowed enforceability as a matter of contract law 
for adhesion contracts, including shrink-wrap licenses like the one used by ProCD.   As far as the issue of 
preemption is concerned, § 105(a) of the UCITA merely provided that “a provision of this Act which is pre- 
empted by federal law is unenforceable to the extent of the pre-emption” and thus left it to the courts to 
regulate the issue of preemption of breach of contract claims dealing with intellectual property rights.  Id. at 
233.  Only two states enacted the UCITA, which its sponsors subsequently abandoned.  A new proposal is 
under consideration, but the issue of preemption is also unclear.  See Peter B. Maggs, The Effect of Proposed 
Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Article 2, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH POL’Y 311.
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itself.  Accordingly, Article 15 of the Database Directive should be revised to 
apply only to sole-source databases protected by the sui generis right.   A 
similarly worded provision should be included in any future American bill on 
database protection. 
As for sole-source databases, three situations must be distinguished.   If 
the database has fallen into the public domain, no problem of overprotection 
may occur since there will be competition in the market.   If the sui generis 
right protects the database, it should be made unlawful for any contract to 
override  the  limits  of  that  right.
128      
In  this  case,  therefore,  the  Database 
Directive must be revised to render all such limits imperative.  Similarly, any 
potential U.S. bill on database protection should render the same limits 
imperative.  If the database cannot be protected by the sui generis right (or a 
potential equivalent right in the United States), either because the investment is 
not  substantial  or  because there  is  no  investment,  only  adhesion  contracts 
overriding the limits of the sui generis right will be overprotective.  As such, 
the  Database  Directive  and  any  potential  U.S.  bill  on  database  protection 
should include a provision to avoid this scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128.    Such limits also include the additional exceptions of news reporting and criticism or review, which 
the Database Directive also should be revised to include. See supra Part III.B. 
